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Introduction
This paper gives an overview of the economics of the Kyoto Protocol, the
agreement that was adopted unanimously by government negotiators in
December 1997 to tackle the threat of climate change. The Protocol was
adopted against a background of hugely disparate perspectives concerning
the urgency of action, the costs of limitations, and the appropriate instru-
ments. In the end, the view of the US administration prevailed that bind-
ing emission commitments for industrialised countries should be
complemented by the use of a number of ‘economic instruments’ adopted
for the first time at the international level.
From a purely economic standpoint, the aim of the resulting agreement
is to tackle the threat of climate change by establishing an efficient regu-
latory framework that sets an international ‘price’ on emissions of CO2 and
other greenhouse gases, initially focused upon industrialized countries
with mechanisms for offsetting against projects in developing countries.
The core mechanism for achieving this is quantified emission commit-
ments (established for industrialised countries in Kyoto’s first commit-
ment period of 2008–12), which are given market-based flexibility through
the use of emissions trading and other international economic instru-
ments, and with negotiations on subsequent period commitments man-
dated to follow.
The paper analyses the economics of Kyoto in two main parts. The first
part explores the basic structure of the Protocol, illustrated with respect to
some of the key debates that went into its formation. The second part then
examines the practical economic consequences of the final agreement 
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on emission targets as elaborated at the Marrakech COP7 conference,
including the economic consequences of US withdrawal. Finally, conclu-
sions offer brief thoughts on the future of the Kyoto system given the eco-
nomic issues noted.
PART I: ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The main aim of the Kyoto Protocol is to contain emissions of the main
greenhouse gases in ways that reflect underlying national differences in
emissions, wealth and capacity, following the main principles agreed in the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These
include the need for evolutionary approaches and the principle of ‘com-
mon but differentiated’ responsibilities, including leadership by the richer
and higher emitting industrialised countries.
The large divergence of emissions between countries is illustrated in
Figure 1, which shows the global distribution of CO2 emissions in terms of
three major indices: emissions per capita (height of each block); popula-
tion (width of each block); and total emissions (product of population and
emissions per capita = area of block).
This figure illustrates several relevant dimensions. Per capita emissions
in the industrialized countries are typically as much as ten times the aver-
age in developing countries, particularly Africa and the Indian subconti-
nent. This is one of the reasons why industrialized countries accepted the
responsibility for leading climate change efforts in the UNFCCC and sub-
sequent Kyoto negotiations: unless they can control their own high emis-
sions there is little prospect of controlling emissions from developing
countries that start from a very much lower base.1 There are also large dif-
ferences among the industrialized countries, with per capita emissions in
the EU and Japan at about half the levels in the United States and
Australia.
1 Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC commits industrialised countries to adopt ‘policies and measures that will
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer–term trends in anthropogenic
emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention’, with the initial ‘aim’ of returning their emissions of
CO2 and other greenhouse gases to 1990 levels. This became the focus of attention in the years immediately
after the Convention and the failure of key industrialised countries to move in this direction was a principal
reason why Kyoto moved to binding commitments focused on the industrialised countries.
WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 4 • No. 3 • July–September 2003 145
The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol
Following the agreed negotiating mandate,2 in Kyoto the countries that
took on quantified commitments for the first period (2008–12) are the
industrialised countries as listed in Annex I to the Treaty. These corre-
spond roughly to those with per-capita emissions in 1990 of two tonnes
Carbon per capita (2tC/cap) or higher—the ‘Other EIT’ category and all
to the left of it in Figure 1.3
At the same time, the currently low emissions and large population of
the developing countries indicates the huge potential for global emissions
growth, if and as their emissions climb towards anything like levels in the
industrialized world. The Kyoto negotiations were marked by big tensions
on this issue. In the final agreement, in addition to the provisions on
national reporting and technology transfer, the Clean Development
2 The COP1 meeting agreed that the UNFCCC commitments were inadequate, and consequently to ‘begin a
process to enable it to take appropriate action for the period beyond 2000, including the strengthening of the
commitments of Annex 1 Parties, i.e. the industrialized world’, to (a) ‘elaborate policies and measures’; and
(b) ‘set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames’, such as 2005, 2010 and
2020. It was agreed that these negotiations ‘should not introduce new commitments for developing countries’,
but should enhance the implementation of their existing commitments under the UNFCCC. Thus were
launched the intensive negotiations that finally culminated in Kyoto.
3 Though the basis for the division is general UN categorization, and a few small non-Annex I countries such as
Singapore also have high per-capita emissions.
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Mechanism is intended to provide a mechanism to start reining in the
rapid growth of developing country emissions without these countries
themselves bearing the costs. The general assumption in Kyoto is that
developing countries will be brought into the system of quantified com-
mitments over time, in subsequent negotiation rounds, if and as the richer
countries fulfil their first round commitments; and the implicit threat (or
bargaining counter) is that industrialised countries will refuse to take on
subsequent commitments unless there is progress in this direction.
The quantified commitments in the Kyoto Protocol cover emissions of
six greenhouse gases from identified sources that together account for
almost all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in the industrialized
world (Table 1). The gases are taken together as a ‘basket’ compared on
the basis of the 100-year ‘global warming potentials’ (GWP) estimated in
the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report for the first commitment period;
the GWPs may be revised for any subsequent commitment periods.4 On
this basis carbon dioxide, principally from fossil fuels, accounted for over
80% of greenhouse gas emissions from the industrialized world in 1990.
Emissions of methane and nitrous oxide in many industrialized countries
have declined during the 1990s, making the targets easier to achieve than
would be case for just CO2.
5
The possible role of sinks—activities that absorb CO2 from the atmos-
phere—formed one of the most technically complex issues in the entire
negotiations. Proponents argued that CO2 absorption should be directly
offset against emissions (the ‘net’ approach) because, from an atmospheric
standpoint, absorption is equivalent to reduced emissions. Opponents
feared that this might allow countries to claim credit for the massive ongo-
ing naturally occurring absorption; that such sinks were inherently far too
difficult to monitor accurately; that it would detract from the pressure to
limit emissions; and that including sinks could give incentives to replace
mature, old-growth forests with fast-growing monoculture plantations. In
the end Kyoto included carbon sinks, but in ways carefully circumscribed
4 Article 5, and Decision 2/CP-3. In the negotiations, technical concerns about the accuracy of monitoring became
eclipsed by the economic and political arguments in favour of including a range of gases. If significant gases were
excluded altogether, it would weaken the scope and impact of the Protocol. If they were included separately it
would add yet more tracks of separate negotiations. But most important of all to the politicians, the inclusion of
some other gases—especially methane, emissions of which are easier to control and in several countries were
already declining—made it appear more cost-efficient easier and to adopt stronger emission targets.
5 In most countries the reverse is true for at least some of the three industrial trace gases, emissions of some of
which are increasing rapidly, and countries are allowed to take a 1995 base year for the three industrial trace gases.
WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 4 • No. 3 • July–September 2003 147
The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol
to be linked to anthropogenic activities and measured as verifiable
changes in carbon stocks.6
Table 1: Greenhouse gases in the Kyoto Protocol
Qualifying Emission trends since Lifetime % GHG 1990, 
Gas sources the late 1980s (years) GWP–100 Annex I
Carbon dioxide Fossil fuel EU static, increases other Variable, with 1 81.2
(CO2) burning, cement OECD, sharp decline EITs dominant 
component 
c. 100 years
Methane (CH4) Rice, cattle, biomass Decline in most countries 12.2 ± 3 21 13.7
burning and decay, (big increase only in 
fossil fuel production Canada, USA, Norway)
Nitrous oxide Fertilizers, fossil fuel Varies, small increases 120 310 4.0
(N2O) burning, land in many countries, 
conversion to decline expected before 
agriculture 2000, decline in EITs
Hydrofluoro- Industry, refrigerants Fast-rising emissions 1.5–264, 140–11,700; 0.56
carbons (HFCs) due to substitution HFC 134a HFC 134a 
for CFCs (most (most 
common) common) 
is 14.6 is 1,300
Perfluoro- Industry, aluminium, Static 2,600– Average 0.29
carbons (PFCs) electronic and 50,000 about 6,770;
electrical industries, CF4 is 6,500; 
fire fighting, solvents C2F6 is 9,200
Sulphur Electronic and Increase in most 3,200 23,900 0.30
hexafluoride electrical industries, countries, further 
(SF6 insulation rise expected
Source: Main data from IPCC, SAR WG I, Table 2.9, p. 121.
6 ‘The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-
induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since
1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period shall be used to meet the
commitments under this Article ... [they] shall be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and reviewed
in accordance with Articles 7 and 8.’ The subsequent Subsidiary Body meeting in June 1998 clarified this clause
as meaning that Parties’ assigned amounts should be adjusted by ‘verifiable changes in carbon stocks during the
period 2008 to 2012 resulting from direct human-induced activities of afforestation, reforestation and
deforestation since 1 January 1990’.
148 WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 4 • No. 3 • July–September 2003 
Michael Grubb
The Kyoto allocations
Timing and base year
The Kyoto allocations (‘Assigned Amounts’ in the formal terminology)
specify allowed total national emissions for the period 2008–12, subject to
the adjustments that could be made through the international flexible
mechanisms. As with everything else, this reflects a compromise between
diverse considerations. The US Administration stressed the importance of
giving time for policies to take effect and to avoid premature retirement of
capital stock, focusing upon a 2010 timescale, and resisted all pressures for
quicker action.
2010 became the centre of a 5-year averaging period (to allow for
weather and economic cycles) in the final agreement, together with a mod-
est requirement that the Parties show ‘demonstrable progress’ towards
their target by 2005. The first binding point in the Protocol is thus in 2012,
some fifteen years after the agreement itself was adopted.
The United States in its original Protocol submission had proposed a
second commitment period to follow the first, with an allowance for bank-
ing and borrowing of emission commitments between the two periods.
The difficulties in negotiating—and even developing positions—on a sin-
gle set of commitments were so huge as to make agreement on specific
second period targets impractical (and unwise given the value of learning
in the interim need to learn more). Instead, the Protocol commits parties
to open negotiations on a second commitment period no later than 2005,
and countries that over-achieve their commitments in the first period can
‘bank’ their unused allowances for use in the subsequent period.
Suggestions that countries might ‘borrow’ emissions from subsequent
periods were recognised as impractical, but the idea was transformed into
part of the compliance package (see below).7
The negotiations never questioned that Annex I commitments should
be defined in terms of changes from historic levels: proposals for other
indices, such as defining emissions relative to population or GDP,
remained confined to academic literature as they involved changes far
greater than countries were willing to contemplate. The Convention had
7 With ‘borrowing’ there would be no point in time at which a country could be assessed as being out of
compliance, hence no point at which to apply any enforcement procedures—a strange interpretation of the term
‘binding’. The United States recast its borrowing proposal in the form of a penalty for non-compliance (a
deduction from allowances in the subsequent period) which was taken up in the subsequent Marrakech Accords. 
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used 1990 as the base year for its non-binding aim—a date which had a
huge significance as the year in which all governments, by endorsing the
first IPCC report, formally recognized climate change as a serious issue,
and launched the negotiations that led to the Rio Convention. The 1990
base year remains as the reference points for the Kyoto agreement: pro-
posals to shift the base year for Kyoto forward to 1995 were rejected on the
grounds that such a change would simply reward those countries that had
done nothing to limit emissions since the Convention process was
launched.8 This has, however, led to varied problems discussed below, not
least concerning the Economies in Transition.
Numerical allowances
The specific commitments, defined as percentage changes relative to base
year emissions, are set out in Table 2. The 15 countries of the EU
accepted a collective 8% reduction from 1990 levels, a commitment sub-
sequently redistributed between its member states under the Protocol’s
‘bubble’ provision (see below). When added together, the commitments
equate to a 5.2% reduction below 1990 levels for the industrialised coun-
tries taken together.
As with any major international negotiations, the numbers can only be
understood as the outcome of a highly political process arising from the
clash between competing numerical aims, structural visions, and root con-
ceptions of political imperative—all combined with the personal and polit-
ical dynamics of the final days at Kyoto.9 The dominant and almost
8 A 1995 base year would have made life much easier for those, like Japan and the United States, whose
emissions had risen since 1990, and it would have allowed a more impressive headline figure to emerge for
these countries’ commitments. Arguably, it would also put the economies in transition on a more comparable
footing. But it would have created a whole new set of problems for handling EIT commitments, and rewarded
inaction. 1990 remains as the official point of reference for when countries first accepted that climate change
was a problem, and industrialised countries had already agreed under the UNFCCC to aim to return their
emissions to 1990 levels as the demonstration of their commitment to lead the global effort. 
9 The central clash was between the EU’s aim of flat-rate reductions for all in the range 10-15% below 1990
levels, and US and Japanese support for reductions of 0-5%, with varied ideas about differentiation and
flexibility, combined with Russian sensitivities and the special circumstances of some of the smaller countries.
The United States traded percentage points for increases in the degree of flexibility (e.g. inclusion of sinks
enabled them to add three percentage points; after Kyoto, the United States argued domestically that in reality
it had only had to concede an additional two percentage points from its original negotiating position of zero, the
rest being directly tied to increased flexibilities). Japan, the third party in the internecine OECD debates, was
dragged reluctantly along to higher commitments than it had prepared. Russia started with zero and—annoyed
by the EU’s opening Ministerial reference to the importance of keeping the ‘three major Parties’ at the same
level—refused to budge. All this was overlaid by root political objectives and perceptions that pegged some
countries’ numbers to those of others. EIT countries aspiring to membership of the EU or OECD wanted to
align themselves with the EU’s standard-setting commitment. Canada honoured its status as a G7 member by
staying within the ‘leading’; Australia, feeling no such constraint, simply insisted on being allowed a big increase.
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obsessive focus in the negotiations was on how to distribute OECD com-
mitments. Flat-rate emission targets appeared attractive because of their
simplicity, and have indeed been a feature of the first round of several
previous international environmental agreements, which have become
subsequently more differentiated over time (Greene, 1996). In addition,
Table 2: Emissions and commitments in the Kyoto Protocol (from base year)
Base year (1990 unless Commitment (% change Non CO2 emissions 
Country otherwise indicated) from base year emissions) (% total in 1990)
Australia +8 51.9
Canada –6 18.4
European Union* –8 20.3
Iceland +10 25.6
Japan –6 5.8
Liechtenstein –8 n.a.
Monaco –8 0
New Zealand 0 68.7
Norway +1 34.5
Switzerland –8 17.8
United States –7 15.2
EITs
Bulgaria 1988 –8 28.8
Croatia tbc –5 n.a.
Czech Republic 1990 –8 13.9
Estonia 1990 –8 16.6
Hungary 1985–8 –6 17.7
Latvia tbc –8 16.9
Lithuania 1990 –8 n.a.
Poland 1988 –6 14.6
Romania 1989 –8 30.5
Russia 1990 0 22.4
Slovak Republic 1990 –8 17.8
Slovenia tbc –8 n.a.
Ukraine tbc 0 n.a.
Note: * The fifteen countries of the EU are listed as each having a target of –8. These targets were subsequently redistributed under the ‘bub-
bling’ provisions of Article 4; see Table 3.
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there was no specific logical basis upon which to agree differentiated
commitments.10
In the central political dialogue between the United States and the EU
there was a kind of logic to equal percentage cuts from 1990 levels. The
United States, with per capita emissions almost twice those of most other
OECD countries except Canada and Australia, was vulnerable to accusa-
tions that it had a huge potential for reductions and should cut back by
more than other countries. Yet internal political pressures pointed in the
opposite direction: the United States had the greatest difficulty in mus-
tering any domestic support even for stabilizing emissions. Economic
studies of the time varied in their estimates of which would bear the
higher cost under equal reductions from 1990 levels. Equal reductions
between the United States and the EU seemed the only safe solution in
such a peculiar political context, and the most obvious way of keeping the
US commitment ‘in line’ with the international community, in some basic
psychological sense.
From a wider perspective, flat-rate reductions were neither efficient nor
feasible as a means of achieving emission reductions. As numerous stud-
ies showed, different countries faced very different costs of abatement.
There was a danger that agreement could only be reached on a ‘lowest
common denominator target’ which would require very little effort from
some countries; or, if the pressures for greater resolutions were over-
whelming, countries that faced insuperable difficulties might simply
ensure that the agreement was full of loopholes. In the end, the negotia-
tors agreed a small amount of differentiation among the dominant indus-
trial powers, and wider differentiation for smaller countries.
In June 1998 the EU Council reached agreement, guided by a previous
non-binding agreement of March 1997, and implemented the ‘bubble’
provision to define the emission commitments of its member states, as set
out in Table 3. These now form the legally binding commitments on
member states in the EU instrument of ratification.
10 Every country that supported differentiation had a different idea of how it should be calculated. Many
different indicators were proposed, relating to GDP, energy intensity, carbon intensity, historical emissions, trade
patterns, etc. Most ‘differentiators’ argued that low carbon intensity (i.e. low carbon emissions relative to GDP)
in 1990 should be a basis for a weaker target; but Australia argued precisely the opposite, claiming that high
carbon intensity showed an innate dependence upon fossil fuels that could only be broken at great expense.
Almost the only common theme to emerge was that each country proposed indicators that would be most
beneficial to itself.
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It was well understood at the time that countries were not expected to
achieve these emission targets entirely domestically, and indeed that there was
considerable room for flexibility arising from the various ‘flexibility mech-
anisms’ in the Protocol (discussed below) in particular when combined with
the allowances granted to some of the Economies in Transition (EITs). Just
how much flexibility this offered was not, however, appreciated at the time.
The context for the EITs was their transition from central planning to a
market economy and the associated economic contraction which reduced
their emissions considerably. These countries tended still to regard econ-
omy, energy consumption and emissions as intimately related, and having
suffered such a dramatic decline they were in no mood to consider com-
mitments that they feared might constrain their economic recovery. Most
of the central and east European countries agreed to go along with the
EU’s commitment of 8% below 1990 levels;11 Russia and Ukraine however
insisted on a right to return to 1990 levels. These lax targets, which (due to
the trading possibilities) were also an important factor in the US’ acceptance
of a target stronger than many had expected, have created important diffi-
culties considered in Part II below.
Table 3: The internal distribution of the EU ‘bubble’
Country Internal commitment (% change from 1990 levels)
Austria –13.0
Belgium –7.5
Denmark –21.0
Finland 0
France 0
Germany –21.0
Greece +25.0
Ireland +13.0
Italy –6.5
Luxembourg –28.0
Netherlands –6.0
Portugal +27.0
Spain +15.0
Sweden +4.0
United Kingdom –12.5
11 At a late stage of negotiations, Poland and Hungary moved back to –6% in protest at the weaker Russian and
Ukrainian allocations.
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International flexibility mechanisms
Emissions trading
Emissions trading—the ability for two entities that are subject to emis-
sions control to exchange part of their emission allowances—has evolved
principally in a domestic context as a means for controlling industry sector
emissions. In the Kyoto Protocol, it enables any two Parties to the Protocol
to exchange part of their emission commitment, in effect redistributing
the division of allowed emissions between them.
This proved to be one of the most controversial areas of the negotia-
tions, though for different reasons in different quarters. Among the indus-
trialized countries, Japan and some of the EU member states wanted to
ensure that any such trading was competitive and transparent so as to pre-
vent the United States using its political leverage to gain preferential
access, particularly to the likely Russian surplus; the EU was also particu-
larly anxious that trading should not enable the United States to avoid
domestic action as the main agent. However, the developing countries
objected more on basic principles, fearing the wider implications and that
the US’ overwhelming economic power would allow it to use the flexibil-
ity to its own advantage over the interests of weaker countries.
In the end, these objections were overridden, but the bare minimum of
enabling language survived in the Protocol itself. Elaborating this into a
workable structure governing international emissions trading took four
years of further negotiations, to the COP7 conference in Marrakech.
The ‘clean development mechanism’ enables emission savings or sink
enhancement arising from projects in developing countries to generate
emission credits, which can be transferred to Annex I countries and counted
against their emission targets. The stated purpose of the CDM is to help
developing countries to achieve sustainable development and to ‘assist
Annex I Parties in achieving compliance’ with their specific commitments.
Emission reductions shall be certified on the basis of criteria including vol-
untary participation, ‘real, measurable and long-term benefits’ related to
mitigating climate change, and emissions additionality (‘reductions that
are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified
project activity’). The CDM is not a fund, but shall ‘assist in arranging
funding of certified project activities as necessary’, and participation may
explicitly involve private and/or public entities. In addition, ‘a share of the
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proceeds from certified project activities’ shall be used to cover adminis-
trative expenses as well as to assist particularly vulnerable developing
countries to meet the costs of adapting to climate change. The CDM has
been the focus of intense subsequent negotiations and institutional devel-
opment, to try and establish agreed procedures for estimating the ‘addi-
tional’ (‘counterfactual’) emission savings arising from projects in
acceptable manners without exorbitant administrative or other costs.
Joint Implementation applies the same basic idea to cross-border invest-
ments between Annex I Parties, but in this case also involves transfer of
part of the allowed emissions of the host country. Because it occurs
between countries that are both subject to legally binding constraints, it
does not carry many of the political and technical complexities associated
with the CDM. It necessarily involves private investment, but to have
legal significance under the Protocol—and hence value to the govern-
ments concerned—it must be sanctioned by the governments of the par-
ticipating industries.
The project mechanisms are the focal point for direct private sector
involvement in the Kyoto Protocol. Moving from the neat theory to the
practical application has however proved complex and time-consuming,
and many private sector actors warn that the slow pace, complexity and
transaction costs of utilising the mechanisms—and the practicalities of the
driving commitments as discussed below—means that private finance to
date has been a trickle, not a flood.
Box 1: Economic and crediting aspects of the Kyoto
Protocol’s Project Mechanisms
(a) Between Annex I countries: ‘Joint Implementation’
(KP Article 6)
‘[A]ny Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any
other such Party emission reduction units (ERUs) resulting from proj-
ects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhanc-
ing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector
of the economy, provided that:
(a) Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved;
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(b) Any such project [reduces emissions or enhances removals by
sinks], additional to any that would otherwise occur;
(c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in com-
pliance with its obligations on [compilation of emission inventories
and reporting];
(d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental
to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments
under Article 3.’
(b) Investments in developing countries: the Clean
Development Mechanism (KP Article 12)
Under the clean development mechanism:
(a) ‘Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities
resulting in certified emission reductions (CERs); and
(b) Parties included in Annex I may use the CERs accruing from such
project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their …
commitments under Article 3, as determined by the Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
(COP/MOP).
Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certi-
fied by operational entities to be designated by the COP/MOP, on the
basis of:
(a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved;
(b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation
of climate change; and
(c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur
in the absence of the certified project activity.
… a share of the proceeds [shall be used] to assist developing country
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change to meet the costs of adaptation.
CERs obtained during the period from the year 2000 up to the
beginning of the first commitment period can be used to assist in
achieving compliance in the first commitment period.’
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Other elements
The Protocol contains many other provisions. One article lists specific
Policies and Measures that countries are encouraged to consider, ranging
from energy efficiency and subsidy reform through to technology research,
development and dissemination. Generally, these were promoted by
many and watered down by others: in general, countries were extremely
resistant to anything that could intrude directly on national sovereignty
over the choice of instruments adopted. However, these references could
provide important pressure points, and hooks upon which to build subse-
quent negotiations on more specific actions, including international col-
laboration on technology-oriented measures. Also, an important exception
to the laissez-faire approach comes in the requirement that parties shall
(emphasis added) pursue limitation or reduction of emissions from avia-
tion and marine bunker fuels, working through the ICAO and IMO,
respectively (international bunker fuel emissions are not included in the
Kyoto national allowances because of the complexity of allocating them to
any particular country).
Other provisions place requirements on all countries (including devel-
oping countries)—for example, reporting on national emission inventories,
and on policies and measures being adopted to tackle climate change. In
addition, the provisions on technology transfer indicate increased atten-
tion to the importance of global diffusion of cleaner energy technologies.
Many of these elements build upon provisions in the UNFCCC itself,
extending and being more specific about the actions required (see Grubb
et al., 1999).
In addition, the Protocol restates a principle of protecting countries from
possible adverse effects of any of the policies and measures that may be
adopted, ‘including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on inter-
national trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other
parties, especially developing country parties’. Reference is made to
Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the FCCC, which list categories of developing coun-
tries particularly at risk, including obvious ones such as small island coun-
tries or those with areas prone to natural disasters, but also including
‘countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated
from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil
fuels and associated energy-intensive products’.
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Like most international treaties, the explicit consequences for non-
compliance are weak compared to domestic law: the most concrete are
that failure to meet the quantified commitments in the first period auto-
matically disqualifies a country from participating in the mechanisms and
will be penalised by deductions from allowed emissions in subsequent
rounds with a 30% penalty factor. Nevertheless, the compliance section
was one of the most highly contested in the Marrakech Accords. The
restatement of the principles that the commitments are legally binding,
and the establishment of an enforcement branch in the compliance com-
mittee, make the compliance package considerably stronger than in most
Treaties. Last-ditch Japanese attempts to water down the package
(rejected) emphasised that most countries do not consider ratifying and
then abrogating the Treaty to be an option.
The Kyoto Structure for the longer term
Although debate about Kyoto has tended to focus almost obsessively on
the first period commitments, the basic intent is to provide the structure
for a dynamic, evolving regime that can effectively tackle climate change
over the course of the Century. The current set of emission targets for the
first commitment period represent the first concrete step in a much
longer-term process of negotiating emission commitments over successive
periods. Negotiations on second period commitments are due to start by
2005; it is generally assumed this would take the form of another 5-year
period, centred on 2015, though a different timespan would be legally
possible.
The current first period emission targets are intended to meet the
Convention requirement that industrialised countries should take the lead
in tackling climate change by modifying their emission trends, and to pro-
vide a period of institutional development of the mechanisms, regime
architecture (such as inventories) and national programs for tackling emis-
sions. The first period commitments were never intended to provide the
definitive solution to climate change, indeed a moment’s thought reveals
that no agreement reached in the 1990s could sensibly provide a one-step
solution to such a massive and long-term problem.
Second and subsequent periods are likely to require more stringent
emission commitments, and for a wider group of Parties, thus gradually
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‘ratcheting up’ the Protocol and its resulting environmental effectiveness.
Similarly, the Montreal Protocol’s initial CFC emission target of a 50% cut
was far from being environmentally effective, but was progressively tight-
ened over time to greatly increase the treaty’s environmental impact.
Figure 2 shows Kyoto’s first period commitments in context, and under-
lines how the Protocol’s ultimate impact will depend upon the degree and
scope of follow-up to this initial action. The figure also shows that global
emissions in the longer term cannot effectively be contained without
emission controls in developing countries as well.
In the US particularly, the Protocol was widely condemned for ‘not
including’ developing countries. In fact the Protocol is very much a global
Spillover = 1
Spillover = 0.5
Zero spillover
Kyoto 1st commitment
period
Figure 2: Kyoto 1st period commitments in context: global emissions dependence 
upon follow-up and spillover
1990 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 21002010 2030 2050 2070 2090
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10,000
12,000
14,000
Ca
rb
on
 em
iss
ion
s (
Mt
C/
yr)
Year
Developing
country
emissions
Industrialised country emissions,
with Kyoto 1st period then –1%/yr
Note:  The black (declining) line shows emissions from industrialized (Annex 1) countries, up to 2010 assuming that they collectively meet 
the Kyoto 1st period commitments and then follow with reductions averaging 1%/yr in subsequent Kyoto periods.  Emissions from 
developing countries are modeled in terms of the assumed degree of spillover: A value of spillover = 1 means that aggregate developing 
country emission intensity (per unit GDP) tracks that of industrialized countries and converges over the century.  Such spillover would be a 
combination of economic, technological and political spillovers, the latter including expansion of commitments to include more countries 
over successive negotiating rounds.
Source: Grubb, Hope and Fouquet (2002)
WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 4 • No. 3 • July–September 2003 159
The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol
agreement, as is the Framework Convention on which it is based. All 
parties, including developing countries, have a general commitment to
adopt climate change mitigation policies and to report on the action they
are taking. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is intended to
help disperse the effect of emission constraints globally, allowing industri-
alised countries (and their companies) to invest in emission reductions
wherever it is cheapest globally.
Establishing quantified commitments for countries in early stages of
development would not only have been politically impossible, it would
also have faced huge uncertainties in their emissions data and growth
trends. It is also questionable whether it would have been technically fea-
sible from a negotiating standpoint, given the huge complexities of reach-
ing agreement even amongst the 38 industrialised countries.
That said, the North-South division embodied in the Kyoto Protocol (as
well as under the UNFCCC) is undoubtedly a key problem area. There is
an understanding that, if and as industrialized countries start to move their
economies onto a less carbon intensive path, the developing countries
must follow, and the Protocol stipulates that its provisions must be
reviewed no more than two years after its entry into force. The structure
of sequential negotiations provides a natural opportunity for engaging
more countries in quantified emission caps over time, but the major devel-
oping countries would have to abandon their present refusal to take part
in any debate about any possible future limits. However, the structure
does offer a natural point of leverage in that the industrialised countries
could simply refuse to take on stronger targets in the future unless more
countries become so engaged over time.
PART II: PRICE AND TRADING IMPLICATIONS OF THE KYOTO-
MARRAKECH FIRST PERIOD COMMITMENTS
Evolution of analysis
In the aftermath of initial agreement on the Kyoto Protocol, many eco-
nomic modeling studies of the first period commitments, conducted under
a programme of the Stanford-based Energy Modeling Forum, suggested
that carbon prices under Kyoto could be several hundred dollars per tonne
of carbon ($/tC) if emissions trading were impeded, or on the order of
160 WORLD ECONOMICS • Vol. 4 • No. 3 • July–September 2003 
Michael Grubb
$100/tC (= 27.3 $/tCO2) even with unrestricted trading amongst the 
industrialised countries (Weyant, 1999).12 Figure 3 shows results from the
set of models covered in these studies, for the US and EU, for four cases:
no trading (giving the marginal costs of achieving Kyoto targets domesti-
cally); full Annex I trading; a ‘double bubble’ in which there is no trade
between the EU and the rest of Annex I but each bloc trades within itself;
and full global trading, taken as crude approximation to maximal use of the
CDM. Generally, increasing flexibility reduces prices as expected, but
there is a huge range of prices across the models.
The IPCC Third Assessment (IPCC WGIII, 2001) numbers on the
costs of Kyoto drew heavily on this set of studies, whilst noting that the
models generally ‘do not include carbon sinks, non-CO2 gases, the CDM,
negative cost options, ancillary benefits, or targeted revenue recycling’.
This rather serious set of limitations goes some way to explaining the gulf
between many of these modeling studies and the claims of some others
even at that time that the Kyoto targets might be met at relatively low cost,
perhaps even in the US (see literature review in IPCC WGIII, also e.g.
Yellen, 1998).
A gulf away from modeling studies, a few nascent and speculative mar-
ket trades did occur. In stark contrast to the projections of the EMF mod-
els, most such trades—discounted heavily by the uncertainty about future
developments, and representing the first trades at the margin—were at a
price of just a few $/tC.
The tumultuous events of 2001 transformed the economic situation fur-
ther due to at least three major factors explored further below: the with-
drawal of the US, by far the largest source of potential ‘demand’ in the
system; revision of Russian energy projections which greatly increased
their projected allowance surplus; and the subsequent Bonn/Marrakech
deal on carbon sinks. As a result, modeling projections of the price
plummeted.
This section addresses the reasons for very divergent views about car-
bon prices, and the relationship between modeling studies and actual
prices that might emerge under the Kyoto first period.
12 To conform with the emerging standard in the UNFCCC and the private sector, prices in this paper are given
per unit MtCO2. The conversion factor between tC and tCO2 is 44/12.
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Figure 3: Impact of international trading on abatement costs (EMF-16 studies)
Note:  'Double bubble' = trading separately within EU and within rest of Annex B countries. 'Global trading' is modeled as giving developing 
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Survey of economic determinants and modeling results
The underpinnings of confusion about carbon prices under the Kyoto
Protocol can be represented in terms of one diagram. Figure 4 represents
the nearest thing to observable data on the potential supply-demand bal-
ance, using the most recent emissions for which comprehensive data are
available (year 2000 emissions of industrial CO2).
13 The main bars show
the gap between countries’ emissions and their Kyoto allocation. Thus,
US emissions in 2000 were 300 MtC above their Kyoto allowance, and
would have to reduce by 19.3% to get down to their original Kyoto alloca-
tion (7% below 1990 levels). EU emissions had roughly stabilised at 1990
levels and the gap was only 70MtC, whilst Canada faced a gap of
c. 40MtC, the highest percentage of any due to its rapid growth since 1990.
In stark contrast, the bars on the right hand side of the graph illustrate
that emissions in the Economies in Transition had declined since 1990 and
were well below their Kyoto allowance (detailed data for EITs, with recent
trends are given in the net section). This illustrates that the countries
scheduled to join the EU in 2004 (the ‘Accession countries’) currently
have an emissions ‘headroom’ about as large as the ‘shortfall’ in the pres-
ent EU countries. The ‘headroom’ currently available to Russia and
Ukraine (respectively, 200MtC and about 90MtC) is far larger than any of
the individual shortfalls of OECD countries other than the US. In total, in
fact, the sum of all these data indicates that the aggregate emissions of
Annex I countries in 2000 was already below the aggregate Kyoto cap of
–5.2%, but with a huge east-west discrepancy in the distribution.
For two or three years after the Kyoto agreement, the usual economic
perspective was that emissions in all these regions would rise substantially
in the absence of strong action to limit domestic CO2 emissions: growth of
US and Japanese emissions would continue apace, the EU would ‘recover’
from the transitional effects of German reunification, the UK dash-for-gas,
and its sluggish economy; and the emissions from the EITs would rise
sharply as their economies and recovered and began to grow apace.
13 Industrial CO2 here refers to all CO2 emissions from industrial activity, specifically energy-related activities.
This accounts for about 80% of the total GHG emissions across all industrialized countries. Thus the absolute
tonnes involved will be higher for the Kyoto basket in full than indicated in Figure 4. Every effort has been
made to ensure that the ‘emissions gap’ calculation is derived from consistent comparison between the target as
derived from 1990 emission levels, and actual recent emissions, i.e. both refer to CO2 emissions from energy.
Possible differences in trends of other greenhouse gases, and in carbon sinks other than the managed forest
allowance as indicated, are not large enough to affect the main points derived from Figure 4.
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Consequently, economic models at that time mostly predicted that a high
carbon price would be required if countries were to cut back emissions
enough to comply, with the US and Japan facing the biggest gaps and
bearing the biggest costs.
In addition to the fact that many of these models used already outdated
data and neglected non-CO2 gases and carbon sinks, three factors have
served to completely reverse this perspective:
• Emissions of most countries, but especially the Economies in
Transition, have failed to grow as many models predicted. The only
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exceptions were the New World economies (US, Canada, Australia).
Emissions in Europe and Japan remain roughly static, and (even more
significant) so did emissions from most of the EITs, where economic
recovery was generally reflected in increased efficiency rather than
emissions growth (see Table 4 below).
• The Marrakech Accords granted countries a certain allowance of carbon
sinks from ‘managed forests’ as shown in Figure 4—essentially a wind-
fall gain, since many forests in industrialised countries are in practice
managed in one way or another—and also allowed inclusion of afforesta-
tion and reforestation projects in the CDM.
• The Bush administration’s rejection of Kyoto removed by far the largest
potential source of demand in the Kyoto system.
The result is to leave a large potential supply set against radically
reduced demand. This has a dramatic impact on the results of economic
models. Table 4 summarises the results of various economic modeling
studies conducted since the US withdrawal from Kyoto. Without excep-
tion, US withdrawal has a big impact in these models, which mostly
assume a freely operating international trade in allowances—in some
cases, pushing the price close to zero. Buchner et al. (2002) reviewed stud-
ies and found the impact of US withdrawal alone to result in more than a
halving of the permit price in all studies except their own.14 The conclu-
sions do not only apply to European studies: the MIT group estimated a
carbon price at about US $10/tCO2 in the pre-COP6 circumstances, and
found this fell to a negligible level under the Marrakech agreement (sans
US) with free international trade (Babiker et al., 2002). Springer (2002)
reviews modeling results, unfortunately without comparing pre- and post-
2001 results, and concurs that ‘estimated prices fall dramatically, reaching
values between 0 and 12 $/tCO2.’
The relative influence of the three different factors varies between
studies, and indeed the impact of revised emission projections is rarely
carried out, presumably because the modelers are not so keen to illustrate
just how wrong they were concerning past forecasts. Nevertheless, the
withdrawal of the US is clearly an extremely big factor.
14 This is due to the fact that the Buchner et al. model includes both cartelisation of the market, and a feedback
between prices and technological change. They argue that the low prices in the absence of the US will slow
down technical change and lead to higher emissions in the rest of Annex B. In reality, it is hard to see how such
an impact of induced technical change could operate so substantially on a timescale of just a few years, though
the point, taken more generally, is pertinent. 
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Kyoto realities: the context
Given the above, many economists have now totally reversed their assess-
ment of a few years previously: no longer will Kyoto be too expensive,
rather the international carbon price will be close to zero and hardly any
action will be taken. In practice this is no more realistic than the former
assessments, for three main reasons:
(i) The prioritization of domestic action. Most countries are concen-
trating first on domestic action. For example, the EU and its member
countries are taking a range of measures in all sectors to limit GHG
emissions, and even its emissions trading directive is carefully con-
fined to domestic action: whilst states retain the right to international
trade under Kyoto, the Directive is clear that companies cannot them-
selves engage in international trading under the Directive. Climate
mitigation policy in the EU already forms a patchwork of measures
implicitly at widely divergent marginal costs, and existing policies in
many areas (notably transport, in which existing excise duties already
typically equate to over Euros 50/tCO2) will be insulated from com-
petition with international carbon trading.
Table 4: International carbon prices from Economic models of the Kyoto
system: impact of US withdrawal
Equilibrium carbon Price impact of 
price under US withdrawal 
Includes Kyoto, $/tCO2e (% decline)
Carbon sinks 
(managed Non-CO2
Model/study forests/other) gases With US Without US
Hagem and Holtsmark (2001) N N 15 5.0 66
Kemfert (2001) Y/N N 52 8.0 84
Eyckmans et al. (2001) N N 22 10.0 55
Den Elzen and Manders (2001) Y/N Y 37 13.6 63
Böhringer (2001) Y/N N ‘Close to zero’
Babiker et al. (2002) Y/Partial Y 10 Negligible
Note. The absolute numbers from different studies are not directly comparable as they may refer to different currency base years, as well as
embodying different assumptions and base year emissions data used for ‘reference’ projections. However the impact of different currency and
emission base years is small in relation to the impact of US withdrawal.
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(ii) Market power and other constraints on the operation of Kyoto as
a fully competitive international market. The international carbon
price could be considerably higher because Kyoto will not operate as
a fully competitive market. The project-based mechanisms will be
inhibited by transaction costs, and international trading may be
affected by the potential for major exporters to withhold supply so as
to raise prices; they also have the option for holding any unused
allowances over for use in the subsequent period through Kyoto’s
banking provisions.
(iii) Buyer sovereignty. Countries looking to import allowances have a
sovereign right to choose from whom they buy and on what basis. For
a whole variety of political and strategic reasons, elaborated below,
countries are unlikely to seek to acquire allowances at least carbon cost.
These factors all involve considerations of political economy, particu-
larly concerning the likely behaviour of sovereign states engaged in the
Kyoto system. Kyoto is an intergovernmental agreement and the only entities
that can be bound by it directly are governments. Value under Kyoto can
only be accorded to private sector trades to the extent that these are endorsed,
in one way or another, by governments. The Kyoto registries system requires
the source of all units to be registered by a unique identifier, so that govern-
ments have the potential to be selective about the units they are willing to
issue for trading, or to accept and use for their compliance assessment.
To understand how these factors may work, the next section explores
the situation in the major countries involved.
The ‘supply side’: Economies in Transition and the developing
countries
The biggest potential sellers in the international ‘Kyoto market’ are the
Economies in Transition. The initial assumption has been that these countries
would seek to sell all they could, providing they can comply with the Protocol’s
inventory and reporting requirements. In practice things are not so simple.
Russian and Ukrainian energy projections are still very diverse and their
approach to selling has been cautious to avoid any possibility of having to
buy back allowances if emissions growth is high. Also, there is emerging
understanding of the trade-off between volume and prices. Figure 5 shows
one estimate of the impact on permit prices and revenues to the EITs, as
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(a) Permit price as a function of the traded EIT surplus
Permit price = f (% of EIT surplus traded)
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Figure 5: Impact of trading EIT emission surplus (‘hot air’) on permit price and 
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a function of the amount of their surplus allowances (relative to the ‘busi-
ness-as-usual’ emissions in this projection), more colloquially known as
‘hot air’. In that study, the revenues to EITs would be maximised by trad-
ing only 20% of their overall surplus, at a price in the region of $20–30/tC
(c. $5–7/tCO2) which would yield somewhat over US$2bn/yr; if more is
traded, the collapse of price outweighs the increasing volumes. The
review by Springer (2002) concludes that if all the EITs were a perfect car-
tel (obviously not a realistic assumption), they could maximize revenues
by selling 10%–60% of their surplus at 5–22 $/tCO2.
This in turn gives rise to the idea that the EITs could seek to maximize
their revenues by operating a cartel on emissions supply. Again however
things are not so simple—in part because it seems likely that the surplus
will be larger and more widespread than originally anticipated. Table 5
shows emissions from the individual EITs, including recent trends. It
shows that for all the EITs, with the single exception of Slovenia, emis-
sions by 2000 were well below their base year levels, implying potential for
a substantial surplus under Kyoto.
The EU Accession countries are for the most part more advanced in the
transition process and it was widely predicted that their emissions would
start rising as their economies recovered. As yet, there is little sign of this
happening, though there is evidence of a ‘bottoming out’ by the year 2000.
Resumed emissions growth cannot be ruled out, but there remain sub-
stantial inefficiencies in these countries and the Accession process (which
requires inter alia removal of various subsidies, including continuing coal
subsidies in many of these countries) may accelerate this.
The relationship between Ukraine and Russia, as the countries with by
far the largest potential volumes of surplus to sell, is also important. This
relationship is already complex not least because of ongoing struggles over
gas supplies and payments.
Cartels are notoriously difficult to hold together. In this case, close col-
laboration between EU Accession countries and other EITs seems
implausible because of the former’s close ties to the EU and the likelihood
that they will be included in an EU-wide emissions trading scheme.
In addition, many individual actors in these countries are more con-
cerned with where the money goes than with the overall flows. Of most
direct relevance here, the Russian Ministries of Energy and of Economy
in Russia are concerned to see that money flows into real investment to
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improve energy infrastructure. The reduced volume of money without US
participation also increases the appeal of using the mechanisms primarily
to try and leverage potentially much larger private sector flows.
This sets the context for the Russian proposal on a ‘Green Investment
Scheme’, whereby revenues from emissions trading would be invested in
environmentally-oriented projects, principally aimed at improving the
efficiency of the energy sector, an idea explored in considerable depth by
a recent international study (Tangen et al., 2002).
Finally, the other ‘suppliers’ in the Kyoto market are the developing
countries. They do not have a ready ‘surplus’ available to sell, but they can
generate emission credits through CDM projects.
Table 5: Emissions from Economies in Transition: base year and recent
trends
CO2 emissions (excluding land-use), MtC/yr
EIT countries In base year* (1998) (1999) (2000)
EU accession countries Czech Republic 44.7 29.3 27.0 28.4
Estonia 10.4 2.3 2.0 1.9
Hungary (1985–7)* 22.2 16.0 15.8 14.9
Latvia 6.4 2.1 1.8 1.9
Lithuania 10.8 4.8 3.4 3.6
Poland (1988)* 115.7 84.9 81.7 81.4
Slovakia 16.3 10.4 10.7 10.4
Slovenia 3.8 4.7 4.2 4.2
Malta** – – – –
Cyprus** – – – –
Total accession 230.3 154.5 146.6 146.7
Other EU candidates Bulgaria (1988)* 28.3 15.3 13.7 15.0
Croatia 6.4 5.3 5.4 5.7
Romania (1989)* 53.4 27.2 24.0 24.7
Turkey** – – – –
Other Annex I EITs Ukraine 191.9 100.0 105.0 104.5
Russia 647.0 395.8 440.0 450.7
Note: Accession countries = the 10 countries officially accepted for EU Accession in 2004.
* Base year emissions are 1990 unless otherwise indicated, on the same basis as other data (i.e. energy-related CO2 emissions). Emissions of
the other GHGs collectively have generally declined by at least as much as CO2 emissions, but full data for recent years are not available.
** Countries not in Kyoto Protocol Annex B, i.e. without emission targets, indicated by italics: no emissions data shown as these countries are
not relevant to the Kyoto first-period trading system.
Source: (1) Base year emissions, UNFCCC (EIA for those with base years different to 1990); (2) Other emission years, Energy Information
Administration, US DOE, Washington. 
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Views on the potential supply of credits from the CDM take one of two
fundamental approaches. One consists of ‘top down’ assessments of
potential, based on estimated marginal supply curves of the costs of the
limiting GHG emissions in developing countries. Depending in part upon
the price projections, the resulting estimates of CDM supply spanned a
huge range, up to more than 500MtC/yr (Table 6). The need for ‘counter-
factual’ baselines (i.e. projections of what emissions would have been in
the absence of the project) also leads to the fear that credits could be gen-
erated spuriously (the additionality problem), with one study suggesting
that such ‘free riding’ in the developing country power sector could lead
to as much as 250–600MtC of spurious credits over the first Kyoto period
(Bernow et al., 2001).
The other approach focuses upon the various institutional and other
obstacles to practical projects and the sheer number of projects that would
be required. This results in far lower estimates of the CDM potential.
Assessments of the scope for forestry similarly cast doubt on whether the
volume of such projects in reality could ever reach even close to the 1%
cap in the time available (Bernoux, M. et al., 2002; Forner and Jotzo, 2002).
The lower prices and demand after the events of 2001, of course, will also
depress CDM investments. A recent estimate of actual project flow sug-
gests that projects in the pipeline as of early 2003 would only generate
3.35MtCO2e of CDM credits by 2005 (PointCarbon, 2003), though rapid
expansion could be expected as the institutions start to operate fully and
if the first deal flows are successful.
The pricing aspect of the CDM is complex. Very low carbon prices are
simply not big enough to make much difference to the economics of real
Table 6: ‘Top-down’ estimates (prior to 2001) of the size of the CDM
Cost Emission credits 
Study ($billion) (cumulative MtC) Implied Annex I emissions (% of 1990)
Haites 1–21 27–572 −4.7 – +6.9
MIT 2.5–26 273–723 +0.5 – +10.0
Austin 5.2–13 397–503 +3.2 – +5.4
US administration 4.2–7.9 100–188 −3.1 – –1.3
ITEA 3.3–3.9 67–141 −3.8 – –2.3
Source: Grubb, M., Vrolijk, C. & Brack, D. (1999), The Kyoto Protocol—a Guide and Assessment, RIIA/Earthscan, Chapter 5: Table 5.3 and
references.
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projects; prices need to be several tens of $/tC before they are likely to
make material difference to investors’ decisions on whether to proceed with
complex, potentially difficult and risky projects in developing countries.
The main implication of all this is that Kyoto will be a ‘buyers market’,
and the ultimate effect of the first period commitments will depend upon
how the importing countries approach the international mechanisms.
The ‘demand side’: EU, Japan and Canada
The European Union
The EU’s efforts are focusing first upon domestic implementation.
Domestic programmes of member states are varied. Some are quite well
developed: it is estimated, for example, that UK domestic programmes
now give an annual incentive towards low carbon investments of about
Euros 2bn/yr (Wordsworth and Grubb, 2003). Germany, France,
Netherlands, Austria and the Scandinavian countries also all have sub-
stantial domestic programmes. In some others, efforts are still in very early
stages (see review in Michaelowa, 2003).
The most potent symbol of Europe’s seriousness about domestic action
was agreed in December 2002, with the adoption of a Directive on the
European CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme. This requires all member
states—including the Accession countries due to join in 2004—to imple-
ment by 2005 emissions cap-and-trade regulations to cover the power and
main industry sectors. In total the scheme will cover about 45% of total
European CO2 emissions and will be at least ten times larger than the pre-
cursor US system on sulphur regulation.
In addition to this tendency to prioritise domestic action, EU reserva-
tion about unlimited use of the international mechanisms has a long his-
tory. At least three other factors will shape the EU’s approach to the
international carbon market under Kyoto:
(i) The politics of EU enlargement. Economic and political considera-
tions smoothing the path of Accession are likely to take precedence,
so the ‘price’ in intra-Europe trading is unlikely to be allowed to fall
to near zero.
(ii) The EU-Russia energy dialogue. Engagement with Russia and
Ukraine will be set in an explicit context seeking political cooperation
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based largely around energy trade, and in particular east-west gas trade
and the EU-Russia energy dialogue. Kyoto units are likely to be seen
as a tool to be used in the context of this dialogue and its associated
efforts to secure a stable basis for foreign investment in the Russian
energy system.
(iii) Political investment in Kyoto. The EU was at the centre of political
efforts to rescue the Kyoto Protocol. This involved convincing both
developing countries and the EITs not only that it was the ‘right’ thing
to do, but that they stood to benefit from the system. In addition, the
EU has relatively strong ties with many developing countries, partly
through ex-colonial links. The result is that the EU is bound (in both
senses of the word) to factor political and strategic considerations in to
any international trading under the Protocol.
All this will take expression in a diverse willingness to pay. For exam-
ple, the EU might be willing to pay ‘over the odds’ to encourage CDM
project in Africa, as compared to countries that are perceived to be less ‘in
need’, or which are already attracting foreign investment. Indeed, the
promise of international money flows form the glue behind the political
consensus underpinning Kyoto. This implies a political need to do some
international trading, but to avoid a price collapse. The EU may be a
buyer, but it cannot aim to be a least cost/lowest price buyer.
Japan
Japan has been ideologically even further from regarding Kyoto as a ‘free
market’ than was Europe. Japan needs the flexibility, but at the same time
the mechanisms are regarded as an instrument, at the sovereign disposal
of ‘Japan inc.’, not a market ‘free for all.’ As such, perhaps to an even
greater extent than the EU, Japan will exercise buyer sovereignty over
whom it wishes to trade with, and on what terms.
Against this background, the deep-rooted difficulties of Japanese rela-
tions with Russia—sustained since World War II by the continuing dispute
over the Kurile Islands—are highly relevant. When in 1998 MITI
announced 20 ‘AIJ projects’ with Russia it was seen as a breakthrough; the
subsequent failure of any of these projects to materialise has reinforced
Japanese scepticism about Russia being a reliable source of supply:
Japanese implementation plans do not formally include any use of Russian
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allowances (Matsumura, 2001). Japanese NGOs are also likely to demand,
with influence, that emissions trading should be tied to environmentally
legitimate investments—the only way in which transferring money to an
old adversary is likely to be politically acceptable. Any Japan-Russia deals
on JI or emissions trading will proceed cautiously, hesitantly, with condi-
tions requiring monitorable environmental investments, and at a small
scale as pilot programmes in building trust (Tangen et al., 2002).
Insofar as Japan needs emission units, it is likely to seek the bulk in the
form of CDM credits from developing countries, and it may be willing to
pay substantial prices, using this in part as a political instrument for main-
taining good relations with its Asian developing country neighbors. Again,
its behavior will focus first upon domestic implementation, topped up by
international access on carefully circumscribed terms.
Canada
Of all the countries in Kyoto, Canada probably has both an interest and an
ideology inclined to treat Kyoto as a competitive international carbon mar-
ket. In percentage terms, Canada probably faces an ‘emissions gap’ larger
than Japan; and it may have less resistance to large-scale emissions trading
with Russia.
Yet even for Canada, it is becoming apparent that reality will differ
markedly from the models, for two big reasons. One is that environmental
and international NGOs, which have a large influence in Canada (and the
wider public), object strongly to the idea of giving Russia money for ‘doing
nothing’, as indeed does the general public. In addition, Canadian indus-
try has mixed interests. Those companies that have opposed Kyoto would
nevertheless like to seek ways of benefiting from it, if Canada does go
ahead. And the most obvious way they can do so is if foreign expenditure
for emission units is directed primarily towards investments that involve
Canadian companies—perhaps particularly for Russia, where the similar
range of climatic conditions makes Canadian expertise potentially valu-
able. Albertan companies, which have so fiercely opposed Kyoto, could be
the first to line up in favour of linking emissions trading with Russia to real
investments in the Russian energy systems—and at as high a price as pos-
sible, if they have prospects of being the main contractors.
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Analogies with the oil market
How exceptional is the Kyoto ‘market’? The above discussion suggests, at
first sight, that it will be so far from the economic ideal of a least-cost mar-
ket as to scarcely justify the term ‘market’, and that little insight could be
gained from expertise with other market operations. Whilst Kyoto
undoubtedly has many unique features, the behaviour sketched is not
really so exceptional.
Consider the oil markets. Despite a century of evolution, international
oil prices are generally maintained well above $20/bbl, despite the fact
that the marginal production cost in Saudi Arabia is probably less than
$5/bbl. Saudi Arabia’s main influence is wielded through the OPEC
alliance of exporting countries, yet even OPEC overall does not exert
anything like monopoly control on supplies, whilst its members them-
selves have widely divergent interests according to their fiscal and reserve
situations.
For Kyoto’s first period, it is not hard to see Russia as the Saudi Arabia
of carbon permits, and the EITs overall, as OPEC. Nor is it hard to paint
analogies with the 1980s oil price collapse, envisioning Russia trying to
hold back supplies whilst the carbon price sinks lower and lower until it
loses patience and threatens to flood the market. One potential feature of
such markets certainly is their price instability, and dependence on politi-
cal decisions and negotiations amongst suppliers. Similar features would
hardly be surprising in the Kyoto first period system.
Yet a view of oil markets that focuses only on supply is also fundamen-
tally misguided, or at least extremely dated. The oil price is maintained so
far above its marginal production cost through processes that are to a large
degree collaborative between producing and consuming nations and with
industry. Such collaboration (mostly informal) is only possible because of
a perceived common interest in maintaining prices that are stable, and at
‘reasonable’ levels, which is generally understood to mean in the range
c. $20–$25/bbl. Importing countries acquiesce (or even actively collabo-
rate) to maintain prices an order of magnitude higher than marginal pro-
duction costs, for a variety of complex reasons. These include the internal
politics of their own oil industries, and long-term strategic calculations that
oil is, ultimately, a highly valuable and (on strategic timescales) scarce
resource. Higher prices do not only protect domestic investments in
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frontier non-OPEC production, and keep high-cost domestic oil compa-
nies in business; they also underpin efforts to reduce long-term depend-
ence on imports through efficiency and diversification. Again, analogies
with the carbon markets are not hard to draw.
Finally, much as the oil markets involve a high degree of government-
industry interaction (though now somewhat less than formerly), the Kyoto
system is bound to involve the same. Some governments at least wish to
protect and support emergent industries that can deliver, and profit from,
lower carbon futures.
Differentiation among the Kyoto units
The Protocol itself places no significant restrictions on the fungibility of
the different units defined under Kyoto;15 all can be added to bring a coun-
try into compliance.16 Despite this effective lack of formal restrictions,
there will be considerable price discrimination for the reasons set out here.
Some such discrimination will come directly from the private sector in this
nascent market. Especially in this formative stage, the value accorded to
emission units by the private sector is strongly affected by both reputa-
tional and political risk considerations. Reputational considerations will
make companies averse to large scale and potentially controversial proj-
ects, such as large-scale agroforestry where land rights are disputed.
Political risk considerations will include the risks associated with uncer-
tainty about what kind of units home governments will ultimately accept.
With the Marrakech Accords establishing the fundamentals of project
eligibility, the major governmental distinctions are likely to depend upon
region—and corresponding mechanisms—but with important subdivi-
sions according to project type (see Box 2).
15 Namely Annex I carbon sink projects (RMUs); CDM projects (CERs, from investments in developing
countries under Art. 12); JI projects (ERUs, from investments in other Annex I countries under Article 6);
Trading of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs, acquired from another Annex I country through trading under
Article 17).
16 There are restrictions on the volume of RMUs allowable (1% of initial Assigned Amounts), though Jotzo and
Michaelowa (2002) make a persuasive case that this cap could not be reached anyway. RMUs cannot be banked
for use in subsequent periods, but their allowable and likely volume is sufficiently small that they can readily be
used in the first period for compliance and other units banked instead. Similar remarks apply to ERUs and
CERs, of which a maximum of 2.5% of initial Assigned Amounts each can be banked. 
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Box 2: Differentiation among the Kyoto project mechanisms
Project mechanisms. Credits from project mechanisms may attract a
premium over AAUs from trading, principally because they can be
seen on all sides to be associated with real project investments—real
action and measured environmental gain—as opposed to paper trad-
ing. Supplementary reasons include the interests of domestic actors
(e.g. within Russia) to use project credits to attract and leverage much
larger overall investment to specific sectors and projects, as well as the
sheer political difficulty of developing domestic corporate emission
trading systems. However there is likely to be discrimination even
within the project mechanisms.
CERs may attract a premium over ERUs for three reasons: they are
more likely to be perceived as contributing to developmental needs in
poor regions; the crediting can begin immediately (as opposed to being
a forward transfer of credits projected from 2008); and they will pass
through a more rigorous international procedure for accreditation.
Amongst CERs, there may be preference for those generated from
small-scale, renewable energy projects under the ‘fast track’ proce-
dures agreed at COP8, because of the general perception that renew-
able energy promotion is a good end in itself and because the COP8
decision removes much political risk.17 Detailed rules for accrediting
other CDM project types have yet to be determined by the Executive
Board. Discounting may be particularly large for some forestry projects,
given both greater potential land-use conflicts, and the longer
timescales likely to be involved in resolving rules for these (which are
not scheduled to be resolved until COP10, in 2004).
17 FCCC/CP/2002/L.5, Report of the Executive Board of the CDM, Decision CP8, Annex A: ‘Draft simplified
modalities and procedures for small-scale clean development mechanism project activities’. Such projects are
defined as (i) renewable energy project activities with maximum output capacity equivalent of up to 15
megawatts; (ii) energy efficiency improvement project activities which reduce energy consumption, on the
supply and/or demand side, by up to the equivalent of 15 gigawatt hours per year; and (iii) other project
activities that both reduce anthropogenic emission by source and directly emit less than 15 kilotonnes of carbon
dioxide equivalent annually.
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ERUs may be somewhat more homogenous, in part because of the
smaller geographic and economic range of the source countries.
However, there could clearly be a distinction between the ‘main-
stream’ and ‘track two’ JI procedures. The former, for projects in coun-
tries that have fulfilled all relevant eligibility criteria, might give
greater legal security about the credits, but for many EITs, full eligi-
bility may imply a long delay, and the detailed project supervision is
slight compared to CDM projects. ‘Track two’ procedures in principle
could come onstream quicker, but uncertainty still exists about the
exact form and functioning of the Supervisory Committee.
RMUs (from carbon sink activities) may be more difficult to locate in
the spectrum of perceived value. Carbon sink projects are frequently
criticised on the grounds that the incremental emission savings are
very hard to monitor and quantify, that they may displace ‘better’ land
uses, and that the carbon stored might later be re-released (the prob-
lem of permanence). In these respects, the RMUs resulting from sink
projects may be seen as less valuable than CERs and ERUs derived
from energy sector investments.  However, this perception of sink proj-
ects is also strongly disputed.18
Direct trading of national emission allowances appear subject to the
greatest political risk, and consequently the greatest discounting.
Conversely however, allowance trading is likely to be an essential compo-
nent of the compliance portfolio at least for Japan and Canada, simply
because it is probably the only source large enough to ensure their com-
pliance given the real-world constraints on project volumes. Within
allowances trading, one can distinguish four possible components:
18 The idea that energy-sector emission savings are inherently ‘better’ than carbon sinks has been strongly
disputed for certain kinds of land use projects. E.g., Chomitz (2002) argues that from a carbon perspective the
differences between energy and land-use projects are far less clear and systematic than often supposed, and
Pandey (2002) makes a strong case that agroforestry in developing countries could have large ancillary benefits
for host countries. 
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• ‘Greened’ trading, in which any revenues from trading are linked
directly to environmental investment; this is likely to be the most
widely favoured and attract the highest premium.
• Trading from OECD countries that have exceeded their targets demon-
strably due to domestic action may be considered next, and would pro-
vide a sense of diversity in the portfolio. The UK is one of few OECD
countries likely to surpass its target, and international availability of
such allowances may depend in large measure upon the EU’s wider
progress towards compliance including Accession countries.
• AAUs could also be made available from EITs in a controlled manner
through non-GIS-type routes: for example, EIT governments could
develop some domestic trading schemes with allocation that is seen to
have some degree of environmental credibility.
• Finally, wholesale transfers of allowances without any such linkage
would be legal under the Marrakech Accords, but for all the reasons dis-
cussed this is likely to be the option of ‘last resort’ and the most heavily
discounted.
All this, of course, makes price prediction extremely difficult. However,
various approaches, or influences, can be considered:
• expert prediction of those already engaged in real trading; these confirm
strongly the hypothesis of wide price differentiation between projects
and mechanisms;
• sufficiency, i.e. prices required to significantly affect investment behav-
iour; this implies prices around $/Euros 10–20/tCO2 to be relevant in
project economics;
• financial flow constraints arising from the desire to protect existing
domestic policies on the one hand, but to constrain intergovernmental
financial transfers on the other.
The last of these relates mostly to Canada, because of its likely high
demand. Table 7 shows implications for Japan and Canada under combi-
nations of extreme cases. If the need for allowance imports is low, and it is
considered acceptable for international carbon allowance expenditure to
reach 20% of ODA expenditure, then Japan might accept international
carbon prices about $20/tCO2e, compatible with the other measures.
Canada, however, with a much higher proportion of carbon import needs
relative to ODA expenditure, may find it hard to tolerate international
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allowance prices much above $5/tCO2 even under relatively favourable
conditions. Much more likely is that Canada will seek large volume inter-
national transfers of allowances at prices well below this, and perhaps as
low as $1/tCO2e. Prices much above this are likely to run into varied polit-
ical constraints: from the same domestic pressures that have curtailed
ODA expenditure to the present levels; from domestic development aid
constituencies, arguing that development is a far more pressing need for
such large expenditures—and, indeed, from developing countries them-
selves, on the same grounds.
These considerations underline why price differentiation is probably
inevitable in the Kyoto system. Prices for project-mechanism credits that
are high enough to be effective, in terms of influence on discrete projects,
are likely to lead to unacceptably high financial transfers if applied to
wholesale allowance trading. Allowance transfers will generally be at much
lower prices—but to avoid undermining the basic purpose of Kyoto and of
domestic measures already in train, they will be contained in application
to those cases where such transfers are deemed necessary and acceptable
to enable countries to comply.
This suggests a wide range of prices, differentiated according to the
nature of the source, project and mechanism. Grubb (2003) suggests that
prices for companies engaging in Kyoto-compliant projects in developing
countries and EITs will be in the range a10–a25/tCO2 for the smaller-
scale, widely-approved projects such as renewable energy investments,
and a5–a15/tCO2 for more potentially controversial (and lower cost) proj-
ects including land-use, but also, for example, for large-scale boiler retro-
fitting or gas conversion. Prices for allowances themselves may be lower,
but they may be seen as having lower value, and little or no co-benefits,
Table 7: International revenue flow constraints on carbon prices
Price required for 
Current ODA expenditure Likely volume of allowance trade to 
(1998 data) imports, MtCO2e/yr equal x% of ODA
US $bn/yr % GNP Low High 20% 5%
Japan 10,640 0.28 100 200 21.28 2.66
Canada 0,1691 0.29 50 100 6.76 0.85
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except where they are visibly linked to environmental investments at
prices that may push towards the level of project credits.
In turn, the prices for large-scale transfers of allowances between gov-
ernments may be lower still; but the private sector will not be given access
to these. The reason for this, fundamentally, is that although emissions
trading under Kyoto has been analysed as one instrument, in reality it will
be used to fulfil two quite different functions. One is the traditional role
of providing market flexibility and efficiency at the margin of project
investments. The other is fundamentally a redistributional function, cor-
recting the excessively lop-sided nature of the original Kyoto allocations.
The cost of making such transfers at the ‘market’ price that would be
required to sustain action effective action on climate change is politically
untenable. Neither ‘east nor west’ has the market power to exact such a
price, nor could the fledgling Kyoto institutions withstand the political
pressures such transfers would generate. So, large-scale intergovernmental
transfers, most notably for Canada, will occur at much lower prices—and
domestic programmes, and the private sector, will be shielded from the
malign influence that such low prices would otherwise exert on interna-
tional efforts to initiate some real action under Kyoto.
Thus in the ‘Kyoto market’ there will not be one uniform ‘price of car-
bon’, but many diverse prices at least in terms of implications for actual
project economics. It may be that international trading facilities develop a
‘carbon price’ for Kyoto units, but not all sellers will make their units avail-
able at a flat price, nor will all buyers choose (as governments) to buy at
such a price. Some will trade at a discount, some at a premium, because
their value to companies for complying with domestic legislation will vary
correspondingly.
This in fact is a characteristic of the nascent private sector market at
present. Companies are more willing to pay for emission credits from proj-
ects that are perceived as very high quality and uncontroversial—projects
to which hardly anyone is likely to object, and which seem likely to attract
the approval of both governments and NGOs. Emission credits or
allowances from other sources may be traded, but at a discount.
The Kyoto Protocol, as elaborated in the Marrakech Accords, will not in
itself define ‘the standard’. It may well do so for CDM project credits,
though even for this, credits from renewable energy projects in the poorer
countries may well be given a premium compared, for example, to forestry
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projects in some of the richer developing countries. The COP8 decision
on expedited procedures for small-scale CDM projects, indeed, could
help to define the first real international carbon market component, and
renewable energy credits generated under the CDM fast track procedures
could emerge to be the ‘marker’ commodity in the carbon market.
The Marrakech Accords may also set market standards for JI project
credits—but the Accords themselves create two tracks for JI. With ‘track
one’ contingent upon meeting quite onerous national reporting require-
ments, and the value accorded to projects developed under ‘track two’
dependant in part upon choices yet to be made by the Supervisory
Committee, JI credits are unlikely to generate a standard marker price in
the near future; and the laxer the standards that may be set, the wider the
price differentiation may be.
For Kyoto’s first period, price convergence, stability and greater homo-
geneity could only realistically be expected both as the institutions mature
and if the supply overhand were somehow eliminated to make the market
much ‘tighter’.
Volume flows and potential carry-over of Kyoto units
As explained above, the international flexibility in Kyoto is not under-
mining the general impetus to domestic action in Kyoto countries; rather,
the mechanisms are being developed as a ‘reserve’ to enable compliance
when countries fall short of domestic targets. This, combined with recent
emission trends, the carbon sink agreement, and US withdrawal, together
have huge implications for the balance of supply and demand in the Kyoto
first period. Table 8 shows two scenarios of potential volumes, that proba-
bly represent limiting high and low cases for the degree of surplus. These
are constructed in terms of emission trends from the latest year’s data, the
year 2000, and taking account of underlying trends (such as high popula-
tion and economic growth rates in Canada).
Under a ‘low surplus’ scenario that combines high demand with low
supply, gross CO2 emissions in the EU-15 might be about 120MtC above
its Kyoto allocation, and those from Japan and Canada might each be
about half that (60MtC/yr) in absolute terms. Assuming that Australia and
the US remain outside the Protocol, and after taking account of other
greenhouse gases and the managed forest allowance, the total demand
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from OECD countries might be about 220MtC/yr. Under ‘low supply’
assumptions, in which emissions from the EITs grow 20%–25% from their
levels in year 2000, the total supply from EITs might be about 330MtC/yr,
to which a minimum level of CDM investment might add the equivalent
of about 15MtC/yr. The result is a surplus of 110MtC/yr—or a total over
the 5-year period of 550MtC presumably ‘banked’ into subsequent com-
mitment periods.
Under the ‘high surplus’ scenario, in which emissions from the EU and
Japan decline 3% below current (2000) levels and Canada stabilizes at
2000 levels, the potential demand (after taking account of the Marrakech
forest allowances) is shrunk to only just over 50MtC/yr. If emissions in the
EITs follow their emission trend of the last three years—essentially flat at
current levels in which economic growth is matched by equivalent gains
in energy efficiency—then total availability of allowances from the EITs is
Table 8: Supply-demand balance in Kyoto system (MtCeq./yr): limit
scenarios
Historical Low surplus (High High surplus 
emissions demand, low supply) (Low demand, high supply)
% change Carbon % change Carbon
1990 2000 2000–2010 balance 2000–2010 balance
Gross demand 220 53
EU carbon 911.4 895.5 7 120 –3 30
Japan carbon 305.3 313.7 10 58 –3 17
Canada carbon 128.6 158.0 15 61 0 37
+ Net other GHGs (+5, –5%) 12 –2
– Managed forest allowance –30 –30
Supply 331 587
Russia carbon 647.0 450.7 20 106 0 196
Ukraine carbon 191.9 104.5 20 67 0 87
Accession 10 carbon 245.2 146.6 25 45 5 75
Other EITs 87.8 45.4 25 24 0 36
Other GHGs (10, 20%) 24 79
+ Managed forest allowance 40 40
CDM (MtC/yr equiv. in Kyoto period) 15 50
Net surplus 110 530
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likely to exceed 500MtC/yr. If there is also greater take-up of the CDM,
then the potential net surplus could be 550MtC/yr.
These are limiting scenarios that combine extremes in opposite direc-
tions, particularly concerning the ‘low surplus’. Far more likely is some-
thing more central; the actual surplus will probably be in the range
200–450MtC/yr, or 1000–2250MtC total unused from the first Kyoto
period. For comparison, US CO2 emissions in 2000 (and in 2001, in which
emissions fell slightly) exceeded the US’ original Kyoto allowance by
about 300MtC/yr.
PART III: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The Kyoto Protocol stands out primarily for its unprecedented inclusion
of a range of international economic instruments. Many of these ideas had
been anathema a generation earlier; by the mid-1990s, when the Protocol’s
core ideas were born, they had become almost hegemonic in economic but
not in environmental policy. The Protocol is essentially an agreement to
extend economic globalization to environmental policy: to establish a
global emissions market to counter the global environmental conse-
quences of global economic growth. A great deal of work remained to be
done to determine how such mechanisms might actually work and be gov-
erned in the international context, a task that took four years and culmi-
nated in the Marrakech Accords agreed at COP7, generally dubbed the
‘rulebook for implementing Kyoto’.
Politically, the most striking feature of the Protocol’s design is the dom-
inance of the US. The United States got virtually everything it wanted in
respect of flexibility for Annex I commitments with the sole exception of
‘borrowing’ (which, in a different form, was finally embodied as part of the
penalties for non-compliance after US withdrawal). The main policy
objective of US strategy was to establish flexibility in all dimensions. This
was a result of the country’s confluence of political interest and economic
ideology. Politically (and with good reason), the administration lacked con-
fidence about what measures on CO2 emissions could be ratified or imple-
mented domestically, and it regarded the ability to meet any commitments
through action on other gases, sinks and international mechanisms as a
political imperative. Economically, US thinking was dominated by general
equilibrium concepts which automatically imply that flexibility achieves
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the same environmental benefits at lower costs: hence, the more flexibil-
ity the better. That attitude, combined with US political dominance and
the relative paucity of counter-arguments, largely determined the out-
come of most of the key policy debates. As noted by the author elsewhere,
‘to discover the source of most of the ideas in the Protocol, one only needs
to read the US proposal of January 1997’ (Grubb et al., 1999)—which
makes the subsequent developments all the more ironic.
Economic fundamentals
In terms of its basic structure (abstracted from the specific numerical tar-
gets of the first period), the fundamental economic issues concern not so much
the mechanisms, but the interface between uncertainties, technology, and
the scope and evolution of commitments. There is no inherent ‘right’
answer to the issue of timescales. Long term targets would maximise time
for adjustment and technological change, but would suffer from huge
uncertainty about their political credibility and give no room for learning
in the interim. Shorter term commitments give politically plausible signals
on timescales of immediate relevance, and allow scope for future commit-
ments to be negotiated and expanded as knowledge accumulates. The
balance struck in Kyoto, with a 15-year gap between the point of adoption
in Kyoto and the first compliance point in 2012, seems not unreasonable,
but its limitations in providing ‘bankable’ signals for longer term invest-
ment are becoming more apparent as time passes.
There are also deeper diverse perspectives about the relationship
between targets and technology, and related issues of ‘leakage’ and longer
term strategies. One perspective equates technical change largely with
public R&D and proposes to focus on some kind of intergovernmental
technology programme; from this perspective, the Kyoto targets are a pre-
mature and potentially costly distraction, and moreover subject to ‘leak-
age’ of emissions if some industries migrate to countries without emission
caps (Barrett, 2001). Most economists, however, remain sceptical about the
utility of governments choosing and fostering technologies, and recognise
that technical change is to an important degree fostered by market condi-
tions (for a review with reference to modelling, see Grubb, Koehler and
Anderson, 2002). From this perspective, the Kyoto targets can be the
impetus for investment in low carbon technologies, with the view that as
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the associated industries develop the technologies can diffuse globally
(aided by Kyoto’s CDM and technology transfer provisions, and subse-
quently by extension of commitments), thus bringing down emissions
globally as well.
First period economics
This is one reason why the Kyoto Parties are focusing first upon domestic
implementation, with the international mechanisms as a backup to aid
compliance, rather than treating Kyoto as a free market. This, combined
with the lop-side nature of the initial allocations and the US withdrawal,
has precipitated a ‘buyers market’ and the first period economics are subtle
and complex. The over-arching role of governments, and the varied inter-
ests and mechanisms as sketched in this paper, have several implications.
Governments are not cost-minimising agents irrespective of geography:
they exist primarily to represent their populations, who would far rather
see money spent domestically than abroad, and far rather see it spent on
‘good things’ than on paper transfers. These are additional reasons why
they are likely to be quite discriminating about the emission credits they
use, making sure they are derived from projects they consider desirable
and legitimate, or are otherwise linked to environmentally acceptable use
of revenues. As a result, as explained, there will be considerable price
divergence between different mechanisms and projects.
Kyoto may evolve towards greater price consistency over time, but price
instability and discrimination between different kinds of emission units
may be fundamental features of the early stages especially. As with other
historical markets, the ‘emissions market’ is thus likely to evolve from the
bottom-up, albeit in the global context set by Kyoto. The Kyoto/
Marrakech Accords simply cannot in themselves set a definitive standard
for the international trading of all the units potentially available, for the
simple reason that this would lead the whole Kyoto system to collapse
under a sea of meaningless paper transactions: the surplus of allowances
available could be several hundred MtC/yr. Given the reality of such
numbers, it is hard to see how a free and competitive market could emerge
in the first period unless the US were to rejoin the system in ways that
eliminate the huge supply/demand imbalance—not a prospect that seems
likely at present.
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Economics of the next step
In considering Kyoto’s prospects, it is important to distinguish between
the basic structure, and the specific first period allocations. Nearly all the
criticisms have focused upon the latter. Obviously, the situation now aris-
ing from the first period allocations is neither desirable, nor not what was
originally intended, and this has been used to claim the whole approach is
flawed (e.g. Victor, 2001).19 If Kyoto does move to negotiations on a sec-
ond commitment period, as mandated, there are three reasons for think-
ing that similar problems would not arise:
• The core problem in the first period allocations (apart from the US with-
drawal) concerned allocations to the EITs that have proved excessive.
This is a direct consequence of the transition from centrally-planned
economies, and would not recur—even most developing countries now
operating loosely on market principles, however imperfectly.
• Countries would be immensely better informed and prepare much
more carefully, in terms of understanding emission trends both for
themselves and for others.
• Second period negotiations would involve deciding allocations not as far
ahead as the fifteen-year gap inherent in the Kyoto first period alloca-
tion, so the scope for major unexpected deviations would be more
limited.
Nevertheless, the potential degree of ‘banked’ allowances carried for-
ward into the second period would exacerbate the difficulties, and in real-
ity, little progress can be expected on developing country engagement
unless and until after the US rejoins in some meaningful way.
Overall, Kyoto can be seen as a potent symbol of intent to control emis-
sions, a basic regulatory framework with initial targets backed by a modest
international price signal, and as a vast learning exercise. Through their
national reporting requirements and implementation plans, countries are
becoming familiar with what can be delivered in terms of emission
reductions and the policies involved. Internationally, they are learning the
19 Note however that Victor’s proposed alternative structure is in many ways similar to Kyoto, being also based
upon the fundamental core of sequentially negotiated national emission caps with emissions trading. The main
differences are that he proposes restricting the system to CO2 only, rather than the full set of gases, and to
OECD countries only in the first instance to avoid many of the uncertainties and institutional difficulties
associated with the transition economies.
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fundamentals of developing efficient international responses including
what is required to make international market instruments work. Whether
or not the world draws on this investment—by proceeding to the next big
step of negotiating second period allocations—remains to be seen.
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